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COMMENTS
NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO DAMAGE AWARDS
UNDER LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 1998
Since the late 1970s, the availability of nonpecuniary damages has
been the subject of numerous discussions in the courts and among
scholars. Much of the debate has focused on three topics: the Louisiana
Supreme Court's interpretation of former Louisiana Civil Code article
1934(3) in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc.;' the effect of new
Article 1998 upon Meador; and, most recently, Lafleur v. John Deere
Co.,2 in which the supreme court read Article 1998 as a reaffirmation
of Meador .3
This comment will review the Louisiana cases handed down since
Lafleur in an attempt to discover common characteristics among those
Cases in which nonpecuniary damages were awarded and among those
cases where they were disallowed. The results provide practical guidelines
for evaluating the chances of recovering nonpecuniary damages in breach
of contract cases.
This comment begins by presenting the historical development of
Louisiana's current law, including a review of the text of former Louis-
iana Civil Code article 1934 and the interpretation given that article in
Meador. Discussion of Louisiana Civil Code article 1998 and events
leading up to the revision follows, and the interpretation of Article 1998
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Lafleur will be detailed. The comment
will list cases, by circuit, since the Lafleur decision, that involve Article
1998 and analyze the consistency of the decisions among, as well as
within, the circuit courts. A suggested approach to the problem will be
outlined, and finally, the conclusion will set forth elements required to
reasonably assure an award of nonpecuniary damages in cases involving
breach of contract.
Background
Nonpecuniary damages are those injuries that cannot be measured
in pecuniary terms. Common examples include mental anguish, incon-
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
2. 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).
3. Id. at 628, 629.
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venience, humiliation, and embarrassment. Formerly, nonpecuniary dam-
ages were grounded in Louisiana Civil Code article 1934(3).4 However,
the application of this article proved difficult, and so cases with similar
factual situations had conflicting outcomes. For example, while the first
circuit awarded nonpecuniary damages for a breach of contract for the
sale of a home' and again in a case where the breach involved a contract
to build a home, 6 the third circuit denied recovery of such damages for
the breach of a contract to repair a house.7 One decision by the supreme
court was to have resolved the conflict, but as demonstrated below, the
law has remained unsettled.
In Meador, the supreme court addressed former Article 1934(3). In
that case, the owner of an automobile sought nonpecuniary damages
from a repair shop after a seven month delay8 in repairing the vehicle.
The court stated,
We conclude that plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages
for aggravation, distress, and inconvenience caused by the five
month loss of use of her automobile, because the procuring of
intellectual enjoyment, while perhaps an incidental or inferred
contemplation of the contracting parties, was not a principal
object of the contract to have the car repaired.' (emphasis added)
Meador prompted much discussion and led one writer to conclude
that "even after the Louisiana Supreme Court announced a controlling
interpretation, inconsistencies and uncertainty persisted." 10
In two cases decided within a year of each other involving similar
factual situations, the fourth circuit and the second circuit reached
different results on the issue of nonpecuniary damages. The fourth circuit
denied damages for breach of a building contract in Catalanotto v.
Hebert," stating that a building contract without more does not fit the
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870) states:
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual
enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some convenience or other
legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the parties,
yet damages are due for their breach; a contract for religious or charitable
foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of
the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule.
5. Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
6. Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
7. Rigaud v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 236 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
8. The court of appeal felt the undue delay consisted of five of the seven months.
Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 322 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
9. 332 So. 2d at 437.
10. Comment, Recovering Nonpecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under
Louisiana Law, 47 La. L. Rev. 541 (1987).
I. 347 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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category of objects the deprivation of which supports recovery for mental
distress. However, in Whitener v. Clark 2 the second circuit awarded
nonpecuniary damages caused when the plaintiff's dream of owning a
beautiful home was not realized. The court found that the contractor
breached the implied obligation of good workmanlike performance and,
when confronted with the decision in Catalanotto, stated that "[w]e [the
second circuit] differ with the 4th Circuit." 3 Finally, in 1979 the supreme
court decided, in the case of Ostrowe v. barensbourg,14 that a contract
to build a house of distinctive design (like those in Catalanotto and
Whitener) did not make the object one of intellectual gratification. The
court found that even if intellectual enjoyment was a purpose it was
not the principal object; the court viewed "shelter" as occupying that
role.
The conflict among the circuit courts may have occurred because
some of the circuits agreed with the dissent by Justice Dixon in Meador."
When the opportunity was presented to characterize a contract's object
as one of "intellectual gratification" as opposed to some other physical
gratification, such as shelter in the case of a house, it seems that some
circuit courts based that characterization upon the amount of nonpe-
cuniary damages proved. Damages were awarded when the plaintiff could
show real suffering. The justification was likely to be comparable to
Justice Dixon's: there is no reason to delineate between contract and
tort when the plaintiff is able to prove damage.
Nevertheless, one can see the need for revision in the area of
nonpecuniary damages that existed at that time. In 1984, the Louisiana
Legislature replaced Article 1934(3) with Civil Code article 1998 as part
of the revision of the articles on obligations. The new article, which
became effective January 1, 1985, reads as follows:
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the
contract, because of its nature, is intended to gratify a non-
pecuniary interest and, because of the circumstances surrounding
the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, the obligor
knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would
cause that kind of loss.
12. 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 358 So. 2d 638, 641 (1978).
13. 356 So. 2d at 1098.
14. 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).
15. 332 So. 2d at 439 (Dixon, J., dissenting). Justice Dixon wrote:
There is no logical reason to allow recovery of such damages when property is
involved in cases delineated as "tort," and yet deny recovery of similar damages
when property involved (as in this case), simply because the cause of action is
delineated as "contract." Both involve a duty and a breach .... In the instant
case, plaintiff has proved, to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, that she
suffered inconvenience, distress and aggravation because of defendant's breach
of duty. She should recover therefor.
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Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be
recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure,
to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee.
Expectations were that the ambiguities inherent in old Article 1934
would be eliminated.16 However, one may see similarities in these articles,
as the supreme court did in Lafleur v. John Deere Co.' 7
Lafleur involved consolidated cases in which two plaintiffs, the
purchaser and the user of an allegedly defective grain drill, brought an
action to recover damages from the drill manufacturer, John Deere,
and the seller, F. Hollier and Sons. The lower court awarded compen-
satory damages for crop loss plus expenses. In addition, the court
awarded damages for mental anguish based on the buyer's worrying
caused by financial difficulties brought on by the poor crop. The supreme
court reversed this portion of the judgment stating, "such worry is not
within the scope of the risk to which is extended Deere's duty to deliver
a useful grain drill."'"
The court distinguished Lafleur from Meador, which it viewed as
a simple service contract, 9 stating that Lafleur contained both delictual
as well as contractual elements.20 The court made this distinction as part
of its discussion of whether, when nonpecuniary damages are not re-
coverable in cases of simple breach of contract, such damages may be
recovered in tort or in redhibition.2' This issue was ultimately avoided
16. Comment (a) to La. Civ. Code art. 1998 states:
This Article is new. It changes the law in part. As interpreted in Meador v.
Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., (cite omitted) C.C. Art. 1934(3) (1870) allows recovery
of damages for nonpecuniary losses only for breach of a contract which has
"intellectual enjoyment" as its principal or exclusive purpose. Under this Article,
such damages are recoverable when a contract has been made for the gratification
of a nonpecuniary interest and, because of circumstances surrounding its for-
mation or breach, the obligor knew or should have known that his failure to
perform would cause nonpecuniary loss. Such damages are also recoverable when
regardless of the nature of the contract or the purpose for which it has been
made, the obligor, through his breach, intends to aggrieve or hurt the feelings
of the obligee.
17. 491 So. 2d at 629.
18. Id. at 631.
19. Id. at 630.
20. The court stated:
A normal breach of contract not involving delictual conduct is governed, as
respects damages, by La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (at present CC 1998). There
are however, contract situations where there occur damages by reason of fault
which are distinct from and/or in addition to breach of a conventional obligation.
Such is the case where a product is sold which is not reasonably safe for its





because the court found that the evidence did not support an award
for mental pain and anguish damages under any theory.
What is so interesting about Lafleur, however, is that section of
the opinion devoted to reaffirming Meador. The court stated that Meador
did not apply because Lafleur was not a simple breach of contract. 2
But before reaching that conclusion, Justice Calogero, author of the
majority opinion in Meador, responded to the statement by the court
of appeal that "the Meador rule is no longer inflexibly applied to
preclude awards of nonpecuniary damages:
21
This position is not well taken. In fact no opinion of this court
after Meador has repudiated its holding, despite criticism by
some Law Review commentators.
24
Justice Calogero continued:
[E]fforts to overrule Meador through legislation failed in 1984 ....
... The only changes to La.Civ.Code art. 1934(3) were to
substitute a contract "to gratify a nonpecuniary interest" for a
contract having "for its object the gratification of some intel-
lectual enjoyment." . . . . [Tihe substitution of gratification of
nonpecuniary interest for gratification of some intellectual en-
joyment, serve to clarify and make more certain under the law
the Meador resolution .... 25
The last statement by Justice Calogero cited above is the focus of the
remainder of this paper. Has Article 1998 "served to clarify and make
more certain under the law the Meador resolution?"
The discussion of Meador in Lafleur is subject to criticism: textually-
based arguments support the theory that Meador is no longer the rule.
Comparison of the language of old Article 1934(3) and new Article 1998
demonstrates that an award of nonpecuniary damages should no longer
be restricted to cases involving the breach of a contract where the
principal or exclusive object is the gratification of a nonpecuniary in-
terest.
For instance, former Article 1934(3) used the language "where the
contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoy-
ment." New Article 1998 states that damages may be recovered "when
the contract, because of its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary
22. Id.
23. Fontenot v. F. Hollier & Sons, 478 So. 2d 1379, 1386 (La. App. 3d-Cir. 1985).
24. 491 So. 2d at 628. Justice Calogero was referring to Litvinoff, Moral Damages,
38 La. L. Rev. 1 (1977) and Johnson, Obligations, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1976-77 Term, 38 La. L. Rev. 345 (1978).
25. 491 So. 2d at 629 (emphasis added).
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interest." The use of the article "a" indicates that a nonpecuniary
interest need no longer be the principal or exclusive object of the
contract. Rather, it is enough that a nonpecuniary interest be an object
of the contract.
Further support for this proposition appears in the change of lan-
guage from "gratification of some intellectual enjoyment" to "intended
to gratify a nonpecuniary interest." Elimination of the word "intellec-
tual" acknowledges that, although the contract may have physical char-
acteristics, we look to the interest that the party intended to satisfy.
The examples given in Article 1934(3)26 were narrowly drawn. The fact
that Article 1998 no longer provides examples also indicates an intent
to broaden the protected interests. The new article also uses the phrase
"because of its nature," which calls upon the court to investigate a
party's motive for a contract, regardless of the physical nature of the
contract's object, because almost all contracts can be viewed as involving
some physical interest.
While the legislature intended to provide certainty in the law because
of the inconsistencies among the decisions of the courts, it is doubtful
that the legislature intended to "make more certain the law under
Meador." If that were the intent of the legislature, Article 1998 might
have read, "Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the
exclusive object of the contract is the gratification of nonpecuniary
interests." The absence of such language, given the state of the law at
the time of the revision, is an indication that the legislature intended
to overrule Meador and make nonpecuniary damages more readily avail-
able in a breach of contract action.
Analysis
As will be shown in the discussion that follows, Justice Calogero's
prediction that Article 1998 has made the Meador resolution more certain
has not been realized. This section will concentrate on the consistency
of opinions within the circuit courts. It will also recognize any divergence
among circuits in cases with similar factual situations.
First Circuit
Unfortunately, the first circuit has had little to say about nonpe-
cuniary damages since the enactment of Article 1998. In Nippert v.
Baton Rouge Railcar Services,2 7 an owner of railcars sued the repairer
alleging damages for failure to repair the railcars properly. The trial
court awarded damages including lost profits, but denied plaintiff's
26. See supra note 4.
27. 526 So. 2d 824 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 530 So. 2d 84, 87, 91 (1988).
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request of damages for aggravation and mental anguish. In that part
of the opinion dealing with this denial, the court stated that although
"damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered in contract cases,
.. we agree with the trial court that the record does not support such
awards. "28
Although the plaintiff failed to prove nonpecuniary damages, it is
disappointing that the court did not take the opportunity to expand on
the meaning of Article 1998. While what constitutes a "nonpecuniary
interest" remains subject to debate, the repair of a railcar would seem
to be outside the category of a contract "intended to gratify a non-
pecuniary interest." Unlike the contract in Meador, involving the repair
of an automobile, the contract in Nippert is of a commercial nature.
The two cases are distinguishable in that a contract to repair an au-
tomobile is of a "personal nature." The dealership must have known
that a delay in repairing something as personal as one's automobile
would cause frustration and aggravation.
In another case, a homeowner brought an action against a contractor
for damages after a brick patio and two brick walkways constructed at
the owner's residence "buckled and came apart." In that case, Miller
v. Thompson,29 the factual situation arose before enactment of Article
1998, and therefore the case was decided under former Article 1934.
However, the court recognized the new article in stating that "nonpe-
cuniary loss is recoverable when the object of the contract is the grat-
ification of intellectual enjoyment. This has been incorporated in the
present Article 1998.1130 The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
finding that "the object of the contract between Miller and Thompson
was to fulfill a utilitarian purpose rather than to gratify a nonpecuniary
interest."'" The trial court reached this conclusion because the "weight
of the evidence indicat[ed] that the work was for utility rather than
aesthetic purposes. ' 32 One conclusion, suggested by this language, is
that had the plaintiff proved that he simply built the patio and walkways
to beautify his home rather than as a necessary addition, he may have
recovered nonpecuniary damages.
Second Circuit
The second circuit first addressed Article 1998 in Gaither v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Company.33 In this case Mr. and Mrs. Gaither, customers
28. Id. at 828.
29. 542 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 544 So. 2d 407 (1989).
30. Id. at 98.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 475 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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of the gas company, brought an action for damages arising out of the
company's termination of gas service to a house owned by the Gaithers
but occupied by relatives. The couple had not been delinquent in their
payment and were not notified of termination. The relatives, who had
been delinquent at their previous residence, gave this new address to
the gas company as a forwarding address. The gas company considered
the relatives, rather than the Gaithers, as its "customer" even though
the gas account was in the Gaithers' name. As a result of nonpayment
of the delinquency by the relatives, the gas company turned off the gas
to the Gaithers' house at which the relatives resided. The trial court
awarded $750 for embarrassment and humiliation.
The gas company contended that the action was in contract and
that Article 1998 prevented recovery of nonpecuniary damages because
of the factual situation. After citing Article 1998 and discussing com-
ments (a) and (b), the court stated, "We need not determine whether
the plaintiffs have a remedy under contract and shall assess damages
under CC Art. 2315." 34 Thus, the court was able to avoid the question
of whether this situation called for the application of Article 1998. As
was the case with Nippert in the first circuit, it is apparent the article
would not apply to this action because a contract to supply gas to a
home has a principally utilitarian purpose.
The subject arose again in Thomas v. Bienville Parish School Board,3
and this time the court made its position clear. In Thomas, employees
of the school board brought an action against the board for medical
and hospital expenses allegedly due because of the school board's neg-
ligence in failing to properly process their applications for insurance
coverage. The plaintiffs also sought damages for mental anguish and
embarrassment, which were denied by the trial court. The court of
appeal affirmed and concluded:
Recovery for damages of this nature cannot be had for a breach
of a contract which has as its object anything other than in-
tellectual gratification. La. Civil Code Art. 1998 (1984).36
The purpose of this contract between the employees and the
school board was to secure insurance, not intellectual gratifi-
cation. "
The court, however, did not explain why it reached the conclusion
that securing insurance was not intellectually gratifying. A contrary view
is that securing insurance provides comfort and peace of mind which
is not measurable in dollars and is, therefore, intended to gratify a
34. Id. at 75.
35. 475 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).




nonpecuniary interest. Consider, for instance, the slogans of three well-
known insurance companies: "Like a good neighbor," "You're in good
hands," and "Get a piece of the rock." Their advertising campaigns
are obviously intended to appeal to a person's desire for security in
times of need.
In Gaither, the court determined that termination of gas service
without cause under a contract gave rise to nonpecuniary damages in
tort. In Thomas, the court found that negligent processing of insurance
applications was a breach of contract not subject to such damages. Only
the court can explain the logic of these conclusions.
Fussell v. Louisiana Business College of Monroe s involved a student,
Fussell, who was dismissed from the college for allegedly disruptive
conduct. Fussell brought suit for breach of contract. The court eventually
held the school had no basis for dismissing Fussell and imposed liability
for monetary loss caused by the delay she had experienced in beginning
her career. Fussell also claimed nonpecuniary damages for mental an-
guish. The court found that she had not proved mental anguish, but
stated: "these damages can be awarded only in limited circumstances.
Defendant's obligation to provide vocational training was not intended
to 'gratify a nonpecuniary interest."' 3 9 Again the court failed to state
its reason for such a conclusion. One can only speculate that the court
felt vocational training would result in employment for Fussell and,
thus, enable her to provide for physical necessities. But the court may
have just as easily concluded that Fussell sought this training in order
to better herself and increase self-esteem, thereby intending to gratify
a nonpecuniary interest. This case is at least debatable and deserved
more discussion by the court.
The most recent case involving Article 1998 is Creger v. Robertson,40
which involved the purchase of a home with redhibitory defects. After
discussing general damages, 4 the court turned to the claim of nonpe-
cuniary damages, stating: "There has long been uncertainty in the ju-
risprudence as to whether purchasers bringing a redhibition suit are
permitted to recover nonpecuniary damages. Formerly, LSA-C.C. Art.
1934(3) was the controlling article." ' 42 The court then explained how
Article 1934(3) had been replaced by Article 1998. It seems strange that
the court did not apply the articles on redhibition, 43 which limit damages
38. 519 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 388.
40. 542 So. 2d 1090 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
41. Id. at 1094-97.
42. Id. at 1098.
43. The first paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 2531 states:
The seller who knew not the vices of the thing is only bound to repair, remedy
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unless the seller knows of the vice." In any case, the court chose to
apply Article 1998 and held that "[in the instant case, the contract for
the sale of the house, although for the sale of a fine home in a fine
neighborhood, was not a contract '... intended to gratify nonpecuniary
interests.'"4
This conclusion is puzzling given the decision in Hostetler v. W.
Gray & Company, Inc.46 one year earlier. Although the cause of action
arose in 1984 making Article 1934(3) applicable, the second circuit noted
that the Lafleur decision affirmed the viability of Meador.4" Therefore,
it is apparent that the court was aware that the recognized criteria for
an award under either article have been held to be basically the same;
yet in Hostetler, the court allowed nonpecuniary damages. This case
involved the purchase of a lakefront lot where the flowage easement
was misrepresented on the subdivision plat. Consequently, the plaintiff's
house was built below the flowage easement. In awarding nonpecuniary
damages the court found that
in the instant case the contract clearly had as its principal object
the gratification of an intellectual interest .... Having lived in
a trailer prior to building this house, the plaintiffs were looking
forward to fulfilling their dream of having a special house as
a home. 41
The inconsistency created by the decisions in Creger and Hostetler
is a clear indication that there is a need for guidance in this area of
the law.
Third Circuit
In Robert v. Bayou Bernard Marine, Inc.,49 the third circuit court
of appeal had little difficulty concluding that a fishing boat "was pur-
chased exclusively for recreational purposes which had as its principal
object ... intellectual enjoyment." 50 Plaintiff had purchased a boat that
or correct the vices as provided in Article 2521, or if he be unable or fails to
repair, remedy or correct the vice, then he must restore the purchase price, and
reimburse the reasonable expenses occasioned by the sale, as well as those
incurred for the preservation of the thing, subject to credit for the value of
any fruits or use which the purchaser has drawn from it.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 2545 states: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he
sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of price and repayment of the expenses,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
45. 542 So. 2d at 1099.
46. 523 So. 2d 1359 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 470, 471 (1988).
47. Id. at 1366.
48. Id.
49. 514 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1107 (1987).
50. Id. at 549.
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was found to be defective. Delays in repairs lasted two years, and the
requested damages included mental anguish and inconvenience. Because
this case arose in 1982, the court applied old Article 1934(3). But the
decision, handed down in 1987, cited Lafleur and stated that "the rule
today is that nonpecuniary loss may not be recovered in a simple breach
of contract case unless the contract is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary
interest."'" The court did not discuss the language of Lafleur that
reaffirmed Meador, treating the language "intended to gratify a non-
pecuniary interest" and "the gratification of some intellectual enjoy-
ment" as if they required the application of different standards. Nine
months later, however, in the case of Leleux v. Morrow's Sports Center,
Inc. '12 the court recognized that those standards were synonymous.
In Leleux, a boat owner sued a boat repairer seeking damages when
the boat he left for repair was stolen. Plaintiff later recovered the boat,
but not its contents or its engine. Morrow's finally supplied a replacement
engine two years later. In discussing plaintiff's claim for mental anguish,
the court wrote:
LSA-C.C. art. 1998 allows for recovery of damages for non-
pecuniary losses under a contract intended to gratify a non-
pecuniary interest. A contract intended to gratify a non-pecuniary
interest is one that has "intellectual enjoyment" as its principal
or exclusive purpose.53
This statement raises the textual argument previously discussed. A
contract to gratify a nonpecuniary interest is not necessarily one that
has intellectual enjoyment as its principal object. The court denied
damages for mental anguish.
The court in Leleux considered a factual situation almost identical
to that present in Robert, yet reached a different result. The court
attempted to distinguish the two cases by stating:
In that case [Robert] the plaintiff testified that fishing was his
only hobby and that he often fished 3-4 times a week. He
testified that he had fantasized about owning a fishing boat and
that he became so anxious and frustrated by defendant's failure
to repair the boat, that he had to consult a psychologist. In
the present matter the only testimony regarding plaintiff's alleged
mental anguish was . . . "it's really been tough," and when his
friends went out fishing or brought their families out for boat
rides, he and his family were forced to stay home ....
51. Id.
52. 527 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 520.
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It becomes obvious that the plaintiff in Leleux simply failed in his
burden of proof. Had he testified to extreme anger or some other
emotional reaction to his situation, the outcome would likely have been
different.
The third circuit dealt with Article 1998 most recently in Hageman
v. Foreman," in which the purchaser of a townhouse brought suit for
defective construction. The court cited Ostrowe v. Darensbourg56 and
stated simply, "Damages for mental anguish are not recoverable for the
beach of a contract to build a home." 57
Fourth Circuit
One may get the impression that application of Article 1998 arises
most often in cases involving the residence of a plaintiff; the fourth
circuit also has its share of these cases. In Leflore v. Anderson," the
plaintiff sought rescission of the sale of a home after discovering that
the foundation of the house was sinking and that repairs would cost
$57,000. The house had been purchased for $55,000. The trial court
awarded nonpecuniary damages to which the defendant objected. The
court of appeal affirmed, citing Article 1998 and finding that "the
sinking problem of the house in question was intentionally concealed
from the plaintiff by the defendants." 5 9 However, no discussion was
given to whether the purchase was "intended to gratify a nonpecuniary
interest."
Perhaps the court was trying to apply the second paragraph of
Article 1998 ,60 which is reserved for those instances in which one breaches
a contract out of spite.6' It is submitted that if the purpose of the court
was to apply the second paragraph of the article, the court misapplied
it. In Leflore, there can be no question of the intentional concealment.
However, this fact only proves that portion of the first part of Article
1998 that states: "because of the circumstances surrounding the for-
55. 539 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
56. 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).
57. 539 So. 2d at 681.
58. 537 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 219.
60. Paragraph two of La. Civ. Code art. 1998 states: "Regardless of the nature of
the contract, these damages may be recovered also when the obligor intended, through
his failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee."
61. Comment (d) to La. Civ. Code art. 1998 states:
Under this Article, an obligee may recover damages for the nonpecuniary loss
he sustains when the obligor fails to perform in circumstances that give rise to
the presumption that the obligee's embarrassment or humiliation was intended
by the obligor.
See Daquano v. Brady, 242 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Vogel v. Saenger
Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945).
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mation or nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or should
have known that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss."
Thus, only one of the two requirements set forth in the first part would
be met. The court apparently presumed the initial requirement that the
contract be "intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest." If so, then
the fourth circuit, like the second circuit, chose to disregard the supreme
court's decision in Ostrowe.62 Perhaps this choice can be explained by
the fact that Ostrowe involved a contract to build, while Leflore involved
a contract for the sale of an existing home. But certainly, under the
canon of interpretation, "the greater includes the lesser," if a contract
to build a distinctively designed home is not intended to gratify a
nonpecuniary interest, then neither is a contract to purchase an existing
home.
One possible reason the court did not detail how it concluded that
the contract in Leflore was one "intended to gratify a nonpecuniary
interest" is that the court did not feel bound by this threshold require-
ment. Support for this theory is found through creative reading of Scott
v. Thomas.63 The victim of a rape that occurred in a "project" owned
by the Housing Authority of New Orleans retained Thomas as her
attorney in a civil action against the Authority. The attorney allowed
the tort action to prescribe, and the client brought a malpractice suit
that was dismissed by the trial court on motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the defendant attorney claimed that the plaintiff suffered
no loss because, although the tort action had prescribed, the victim still
had an action for breach of contract under her lease agreement. 64 The
defendant stated that "a contract claim is as valuable as a tort claim
because LSA-C.C. art. 1998 states that nonpecuniary damages are gen-
erally recoverable in contract claims." '65 The court, rather than refuting
this statement, agreed that while "it is possible for recovery in a contract
claim to be as valuable as in a tort claim, that result is not a certainty. ' 66
The court reversed the summary judgment. It is this writer's opinion
that the language of the court was an understatement. It is apparent
that recovery is by no means a certainty and language to that effect
by the court would have been welcomed. The court might have gone
further and discussed the requirements of Article 1998 as well as the
unpredictability of interpretations demonstrated by past decisions. In
not doing so, the court leaves one with the impression that the fourth
circuit feels recovery under Article 1998 is not as limited as in other
circuits.
62. See supra note 56.
63. 543 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
64. Id. at 495.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 495-96.
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This conclusion is substantiated further in Bishop v. Callais.67 The
parents of a boy who was allegedly sexually assaulted while confined
for treatment in a psychiatric hospital brought an action for mental
anguish and suffering they sustained as a result of physical and psy-
chological injuries suffered by their son. The trial court, characterizing
the action as one in tort, maintained an exception of no cause of action
on the grounds that tort law provided no remedy. 68 The court of appeal
reversed, adopting the fact pleading approach suggested by Justice Dixon
in his Meador dissent. 69 Noting that damages in such a claim were
formerly governed by Meador, the court concluded that
[t]he reasoning of Meador is questionable today because of the
passage of Civil Code Article 1998 in 1984 .... Thus, recovery
for nonpecuniary loss in breach of contract cases is clearly
expanded beyond the "intellectual gratification" of Meador."
Such a statement shows total disregard for the supreme court's
decision in Lafleur, which indicates that Article 1998 makes "more
certain under the law the Meador resolution." But at least the court's
attitude towards recovery of nonpecuniary damages is consistent.
Fifth Circuit
In the 1982 case of Ditcharo v. Stepanek,7 plaintiffs brought an
action for rescission of the sale of a home after discovering termite
infestation. The trial court granted damages rather than rescission, but
denied nonpecuniary damages. The defendants appealed, and plaintiffs
answered seeking nonpecuniary damages once again. 72 On rehearing, the
court of appeal said that the right of recovery of nonpecuniary damages
was governed by Article 1998. 71 Finding that the plaintiffs were entitled
to such damages the court stated:
Applying the requirements of Article 1998 to the situation here,
we conclude the vendors must have known this house would be
the principal residence of the purchasers. With a sale price of
$180,000, the vendors must have known the house would be
considered a "luxury" home or, as described by the plaintiffs,
their "dream home." Under such circumstances, it must have
67. 533 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1214 (1989).
68. Id. at 121.
69. 332 So. 2d at 439.
70. 533 So. 2d at 123 (emphasis added).
71. 538 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 858 (1989).
72. Id. at 314.
73. Id. It is odd that the court applied Article 1998 to a contract entered into in
1982, prior to the article's enactment.
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been within the contemplation of the vendors that the plaintiffs
bought the house not only as a financial investment but also
for the comfort, convenience, and aesthetic enjoyment inherent
in living in a fine home.
74
Like the fourth circuit in Leflore and the second circuit in Hostetler,
the court in Ditcharo fails to mention Ostrowe. In that sense, one gets
an idea of consistency among the circuits. It appears that the court will
view a "dream house" or an extraordinary home as purchased in sat-
isfaction of a nonpecuniary interest despite the supreme court's decision
to the contrary. The problem faced by the plaintiff is not in convincing
the court that nonpecuniary damages should be available, but that they
were, in fact, suffered.
In a case involving the rehabilitation of a home, the court of appeal
dismissed without discussion the plaintiff's claim for nonpecuniary dam-
ages. In Castigliola v. Dept. of Community Development,75 the contractor
failed to properly perform rehabilitation work. The court simply stated
that "damages are not recoverable for nonpecuniary losses under a
contract, unless a principal object of the contract is the gratification of
intellectual enjoyment. ' 76 One may question why the court, four years
after enactment of Article 1998, continues to use the phrase "intellectual
enjoyment," especially in light of the rehearing in Ditcharo, which was
handed down two days after the court issued its opinion in Castigiola.
On rehearing, the Ditcharo court discussed fully the fact that Article
1998 supersedes Article 1934 and Meador."' One may question further
why the court cannot envision a situation where rehabilitation of a home
is not intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest. If one already owns
a home, his interest in shelter is satisfied. A desire to re-plumb, re-
roof, level the foundation, or install aluminum siding and sun screens7
could be viewed as intending to improve one's living environment and,
thereby, gratify a nonpecuniary interest. Obviously, the fifth circuit does
not agree.
Suggested Approach
Although the supreme court has rejected the views of previous
commentators, 79 the following discussion is presented with the hope that
the court will rethink its position. The policy considerations that support
the position advanced in this article are not new. Consider the following
74. Id. at 315.
75. 538 So. 2d 1139 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
76. Id. at 1141.
77. 538 So. 2d at 314-15.
78. These are the repairs requested by plaintiff. 538 So. 2d at 1140.
79. See supra note 24.
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excerpt by the Reporter of the Obligations Committee of the Louisiana
State Law Institute:
It should be noted ... that nonpecuniary damages are recov-
erable in tort. There is no valid reason to preserve the distinction
between tort and breach of contract insofar as moral damages
are concerned, as was clearly expressed by Justice Dixon in his
dissent in Meador v. Toyota .... 80
This is the position most commonly taken by those who support recovery
of nonpecuniary damages in breach of contract cases.8"
Given the arguments for expansion of the application of nonpe-
cuniary damages to cases involving breach of contract where nonpe-
cuniary interests are an object of the contract, though not necessarily
the object, the question becomes how the court will grant such damages.
With respect to the application of nonpecuniary damages, contracts may
be broken down into three categories: those in which nonpecuniary
damages are a certainty; those in which nonpecuniary damages are clearly
not available; and those in which there is the potential for nonpecuniary
damages.
Those cases in which nonpecuniary damages are clearly available
include those cases that were listed as examples in former Article 1934(3):
a contract for religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage,
an engagement for a work of some fine art. There are a few other
types that probably fit this category, such as a contract involving funeral
arrangements. The cause or motive for these contracts is unquestionably
the gratification of nonpecuniary interests.
Likewise, it seems fairly easy to determine what types of contracts
that, when breached, are not subject to claims of nonpecuniary damages.
These contracts include commercial contracts, including contracts for
the payment of money, investment contracts, and those other types of
contracts whose object is clearly one of pecuniary gain.82
The problem area includes those contracts in which the object is of
a physical nature, but in which the circumstances reflect the contem-
plation of nonpecuniary interests. Contracts that fit within this category
include contracts between individuals and also those between merchant
and consumer that contemplate both pecuniary and nonpecuniary in-
terests. It is in these cases that one must determine whether the breach
80. Expose Des Motifs of the Projet of Titles III and IV of Book III of the Civil
Code of Louisiana, at 53.
81. T/tete, Tort Roots and Ramifications of the Obligations Revision, 32 Loy. L.
Rev. 47 (1986); Comment, Damages Ex Contractu: Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages
for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1160
(1974).
82. See generally Litvinoff, supra note 24, at 15.
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has resulted in compensable damage to a nonpecuniary interest, because
mere worry or vexation is not compensable as a nonpecuniary loss. 3
To make this determination, the courts must focus on two aspects of
the contract as required under Article 1998. They must first look at the
nature of the contract. Is it one that contains elements of nonpecuniary
interest? If so, the courts must then look to the circumstances sur-
rounding both the formation and the breach to determine if the obligor
knew or should have known that his failure to perform would cause
nonpecuniary loss. The plaintiff should bear the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, both a loss and such knowledge by
the obligor.
Conclusion
Despite the strong textual arguments for overruling Meador, the
courts continue to apply the standards outlined in that case. One may
get the impression that in every circuit except the fourth, the claim must
be substantiated by an overwhelming factual showing. The fourth circuit
seems to be more willing to accept the proposition that a contract alleged
by a plaintiff to be one intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest is,
in fact, just that.
In any case, until the supreme court recognizes that a nonpecuniary
interest need not be the exclusive object of a contract, the following
elements appear to be essential to a successful claim for nonpecuniary
damages in any circuit. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his
intention in entering the contract was the satisfaction of a nonpecuniary
interest. This will require the plaintiff to overcome the strong, but
rebuttable, presumption that his contract had some physical gratification
as its purpose. For example, in the case of a house, the presumption
is that a purchaser is satisfying a need for shelter. If the purchaser can
prove, however, that he is fulfilling a dream to own a certain home
with special qualities, then the courts may find that he intended to
gratify a nonpecuniary interest, as did the second circuit in Hostetler,
the fourth circuit in Leflore, and the fifth circuit in Ditcharo.4
83. Elston v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 381 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1980).
84. Another example of such a contract is the purchase of an automobile. If a
plaintiff is able to overcome the burden of proving his purchase was more than the
acquisition of a mode of transportation, he may be allowed to recover in the event of
breach. Consider the following statement in a footnote to the opinion in B & B Cut
Stone, Co., Inc. v. Resneck, 465 So. 2d 851, 859 n.6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985): "It is
interesting to consider how the result in Meador would have differed, had the plaintiff
been driving an antique Bentley or an XJ-7 or anything more elevated than the proletarian
Toyota."
1990]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Satisfaction of this requirement does not mean the contract may
not have some physical gratification as an incidental purpose; every
contract can satisfy some aspect of physical and intellectual gratification.
For the time being, however, a nonpecuniary interest must be stressed
as the primary purpose of the contract. In addition, the plaintiff must
be able to show that this desire to gratify a nonpecuniary interest was
communicated to the other party to the contract.
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that he has truly suffered nonpe-
cuniary damages. The evidence should be substantial because the courts
seem to require a "clear and convincing" standard as opposed to "pre-
ponderence of evidence." It will not suffice to allege that a plaintiff
was merely frustrated or aggravated by a breach, both because that is
true in practically all breaches and because Article 1998 is intended to
apply in special circumstances.
The cases since Lafleur demonstrate that the law in this area remains
unclear. It is this writer's opinion that the supreme court should recognize
that fact-Article 1998 has not rendered the Meador resolution "more
certain." Further, an outline of the necessary elements to a successful
claim of damages under Article 1998 would benefit all practitioners.
When given the next opportunity to address the issue of nonpecuniary
damages, the court should rethink its position in the Lafleur case and
provide such an outline because, as a noted scholar has written, "the
fact that damage of an exclusively moral nature occurs only seldom is
no justification for a denial of recovery where such damage has been
proved."8
Gary P. Graphia
85. Professor Litvinoff cited 7 M. Planiol Et G. Ripert, Traite Pratique De Droit
Civil Francais 186, 187 (2d ed. Esmein trans. 1954). See Litvinoff, supra note 24, at 3.
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